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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAKING A
SPORTS FRANCHISE BY EMINENT DOMAIN
AND THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
TO RESTRICT FRANCHISE RELOCATION
I. Introduction
The possibility that a city may successfully take a sports franchise
under its power of eminent domain' can no longer be deemed "a
joke." 2 Despite the fact that condemnation3 proceedings traditionally
have been used to accomplish such limited public purposes as the
"construction and maintenance of streets, highways and parks," ' 4
two cities presently are engaged in legal efforts to acquire football
teams by condemnation.: Should one of these actions prove suc-
cessful, this type of action may proliferate. 6
1. Eminent domain is a governmental power which may be used to acquire
property for public use from an unconsenting owner provided the owner receives
just compensation. See 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1981);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979) (eminent domain is "[t]he power to
take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons
or corporations authorized to exercise functions of a public character").
2. See Oakland Blitzes the Raiders, 100 NEWSWEEK 68 (July 26, 1982) (Raider's
team counsel Moses Lasky termed Oakland's effort to acquire football Raiders by
eminent domain "a joke").
3. Condemnation is the "[p]rocess of taking private property for public use
through the power of eminent domain." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (5th ed.
1979). This Note will use the terms "condemnation" and "eminent domain"
interchangeably.
4. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 72, 646 P.2d 835,
842, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 681 (1982).
5. The City of Oakland is currently appealing the trial court's most recent
decision rendering judgment in favor of the Raiders football team and dismissing
the entire action. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Judgment
at 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed Aug. 10, 1984) (available in Fordham
Urban Law Journal office). The City of Baltimore also is pursuing a condemnation
proceeding against the Colts football team. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954, 955 (7th Cir. 1984) (court held that district
court was without interpleader jurisdiction).
6. Should such a proliferation occur, lawyers representing owners of sports
franchises will have to become more adept in the law of eminent domain. See
Sullivan, Oakland v. The Raiders: Eminent Domain Law Will Never Be The Same,
13 No. 2 PROB. & PROP. NEWSLETTER 21, 24 (Fall 1984) (concluding that lawyers
representing professional sports franchise owners must become familiar with eminent
domain, antitrust, civil rights laws, diversity jurisdiction and injunction procedures)
[hereinafter cited as Sullivan]. While the Constitution defines the outer limits of
eminent domain law, state eminent domain law may provide further restrictions.
See infra note 50 and accompanying text. However, it is interesting to note that
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Cities are interested in preventing their teams from relocating
because the operation of a sports franchise encourages recreational
and spectator activity,7 promotes civic pride,' provides employment
opportunities and stimulates the local economy. 9 The magnitude of
a municipality's interest in preventing team relocation increases when
it subsidizes stadium constructions. 0 Sports franchises, however,
often are enticed to relocate by the prospect of short-term financial
gain despite the support they receive and their close associations
with their communities."
When a conflict arises between the franchise's interests and those
of the community, a municipality may bring an eminent domain
action in an effort to acquire the team and thereby protect its
interests. Although recently publicized eminent domain cases have
focused on the Constitution's public use requirement," a number
of other constitutional limitations may prevent a city from taking
sports franchises.
This Note examines the constitutional public use, just compen-
sation, right to travel and commerce clause limitations as applied
to the taking of sports franchises by eminent domain. This Note
concludes that eminent domain is an improper method of protecting
New York City did not attempt to acquire the football Jets by eminent domain
when they decided to move to New Jersey.
7. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
12. The California Supreme Court has held that a city may acquire a -sports
franchise by condemnation if it can demonstrate a valid public use for its action.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 72, 646 P.2d 835, 843, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 681 (1982). This decision broadly interpreted the fifth amendment's
public use limitation, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and caused fear that a city might
use its eminent domain power to acquire ordinary businesses that intend to relocate.
See Note, Eminent Domain Exercised-Stare Decisis or a Warning: City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, 4 PACE L. REV. 169, 192-93 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Stare
Decisis]; see also Oakland Blitzes the Raiders, 100 NEWSWEEK 68 (July 26, 1982)
(mentioning concern that City of Anaheim could take over Disneyland); Note,
Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders and
Poletown?, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 82, 107-08 (1983) (concluding that public use
requirement was so broadly defined in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32
Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982), and Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), that it was
"no longer a restraint" and only legislative action could prevent endangerment of
property rights) [hereinafter cited as Are There Limits]. Since the Raiders decision,
the Supreme Court similarly has interpreted the constitutional requirement of public
use in a broad manner and held that the role of courts in evaluating the validity
of the use is very limited. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
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cities' interests in preventing the relocation of sports franchises.
Consequently, it suggests that only carefully drawn federal legislation
can protect a city's interest in keeping its sports franchises without
subjecting franchises to nonuniform and discriminatory treatment. 3
II. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
The variety of issues facing a city which attempts to condemn a
sports franchise is illustrated by City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 4
the first 5 and only 6 decided case involving a city's attempt to use
its eminent domain power to acquire a professional sports team. In
1980, the Oakland Raiders (Raiders) announced its intention to move
its football team to Los Angeles.' 7 Subsequently, the City of Oakland
brought an eminent domain action to acquire the property rights
associated with ownership of the Raiders professional football team
as a franchise member of the National Football League (NFL). 8
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Raiders
and dismissed the City of Oakland's action with prejudice. 9 The
court's decision was based on its finding that "no 'public use'
essential to an eminent domain action could be -found, and [that
the city] lacked the authority to exercise eminent domain for the
purpose of retaining the Raiders' franchise in Oakland." 0 The ap-
pellate court affirmed, stating that there was no statutory author-
ization for the "condemnation of the diverse contract rights necessary
to operation of the Raiders' business enterprise." ' 2'
13. See infra Section VI.
14. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
15. Id. at 70, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
16. There has not been a decision on the merits of the City of Baltimore's
condemnation action against the Colts professional football team. Two opinions
on interlocutory issues have been published. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Bal-
timore, 733 F.2d 484, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1984) (granting Baltimore's motion for stay
of Indiana district court's injunction which prohibited Baltimore from proceeding
with its eminent domain action filed in Maryland, and denying Baltimore's request
for order enjoining Colts from preparing to play football in Indianapolis pending
appeal of interpleader action); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 741 F.2d
954, 958 (7th Cir. 1984) (vacating district court's orders and dismissing suit because
interpleader jurisdiction was improper and there was no other basis for federal
jurisdiction in Indiana's district court).
17. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 63, 646 P.2d 835,
837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
18. Id. at 63, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
19. Id.
20. Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 170-71 (1983), quoting Brief for Appellant
at 7, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673 (1982) (quoting Monterey County Superior Court's unpublished opinion).
21. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 430, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 646, 650 (1981) (Cal. App. 3d opinion subsequently deleted).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of California considered whether
there was sufficient factual controversy to warrant a trial on the
merits over the following issues: (1) whether intangible property
could be taken by eminent domain; and (2) whether the public use
requirement was broad enough to encompass the taking of a sports
franchise. 22 With respect to the first issue, the court held that taking
intangible property by eminent domain was authorized because nei-
ther the federal23 and state constitutions 24 nor the revised California
eminent domain law2" distinguished between real or personal property
and tangible or intangible property. 26 On the second issue, the court
concluded "that the acquisition and . . operation of a sports
franchise may be an appropriate municipal function. ' 27 The court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether, on the
facts, there was a valid public use to justify the city's proposed
action.28
The superior court of Monterey County, in a bifurcated trial, 29
rendered a tentative decision in favor of the Raiders. 0 The trial
court offered five grounds for its conclusion that the City of Oakland
did not have the right to take the Raiders.3' After a unique appeal
22. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835,
837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
25. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170 (West 1982) (broadly defining property
subject to taking as including "real and personal property and any interest therein");
see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 65, 646 P.2d 835,
838, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982) (California's eminent domain law "appears
to impose no greater restrictions on the exercise of the condemnation power than
those which are inherent in the federal and state Constitutions").
26. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 68, 646 P.2d 835,
840, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1982) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
28. Id. at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
29. The trial was bifurcated so that during the first phase the taking issue could..
be decided and during the second phase, if necessary, the compensation issue could
be decided. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d
267, 270, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1st Dist. 1983).
30. Id. at 271, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
31. The trial court gave five reasons for its conclusion that [Oakland] does
not have the right to take the property in question: (1) the property is
not located entirely within the boundaries of Oakland; (2) there is no
reasonable probability that City will devote the property to a public use
within seven years; (3) the property is not subject to acquisition by
eminent domain "for the stated purpose"; (4) City did not adopt a
resolution of necessity that conclusively establishes the matters set forth
in [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE] section 1240.030, did not adopt a resolution
of necessity prior to the commencement of the eminent domain action,
[Vol. XIII
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process,32 the appellate court reversed on each of the five grounds33
and remanded to the trial court to rule on issues not previously
decided,34 notably, whether the stated purpose for the condemnation
constituted a public use.35
and did not provide Raiders with the notice and opportunity to be heard
as required by law; and, (5) the public interest and necessity required
neither the proposed project nor the acquisition of the Raiders.
Id. at 273, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 732. See generally Claim By Oakland On Raiders
Denied, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, § 1, at 7, col. 6 (discussing proposals).
32. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267,
272, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1st Dist. 1983). See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 22,
which states:
Oakland first attempted to obtain a Writ of Prohibition from the appellate
court preventing the trial judge from entering judgment pursuant to the
decision. When this was denied, Oakland filed an appeal from the
judgment; at the same time, it asked the supreme court for a Writ of
Mandate directing the trial judge to set aside his decision on the grounds
that he failed to follow the "law of the case" as enunciated in the
earlier supreme court decision .... [T]he supreme court granted the Writ
and assigned the mandate proceedings to an intermediate appellate court.
This meant that the California Supreme Court had agreed with Oakland's
contention that no ordinary remedy at law existed and that the appeal
in this matter was entitled to bypass the normal 18-month period that
ordinary civil appellate matters face.
Id.
33. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267,
197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1st Dist. 1983). The court rejected each of the trial court's
five grounds, see supra note 31, holding: (1) "as a matter of law . . . [the] Raiders
did not rebut the prima facie showing that the property was located within the
City of Oakland" and thus the "territorial restrictions of [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE]
were met," id. at 274, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 733; (2) the trial court erred as a matter
of law in sustaining the Raiders' objection "that there was no reasonable probability
that [Oakland] would devote the property to a public use within seven years" as
required by CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1250.360(d) (West 1982), 150 Cal. App. 3d
at 274-75, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 733-34; (3) any objection based on CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1250.360(e) (West 1982) was rejected by the supreme court in its prior
decision and "the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in reaching a contrary result,"
150 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 734; (4) "the trial court was foreclosed"
by the law of the case in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,
646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) (vacating summary judgment), "from
redetermining the legal effect of the late filing of the resolution of necessity and
the late notice to Raiders," id. at 278, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735; and (5) the law of
the case precluded the trial court from finding "that the resolution of necessity
was not adopted in accordance with the procedural requirements" and thereby
eliminated its basis for jurisdiction to review CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.370
objections. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 278-79, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735-36. See generally,
Court Says Oakland Can Pursue Raiders, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1983, § 1, at 20,
col. 5 (general discussion of court's decision).
34. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267,
280, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (1st Dist. 1983).
35. Id. at 279, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
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On remand, the superior court of Monterey County dismissed the
eminent domain action.16 The decision was based on several findings.
First, the constitutional and statutory requirements of public use
had not been met." The court found that there could be no public
use38 because the NFL Constitution and By-Laws prohibit a city's
ownership and operation of an NFL franchise. 9 Nor was it possible
for the City of Oakland to retransfer the team to avoid these NFL
rules because California's eminent domain law prohibits such re-
transfers .40
36. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Judgment at 1-2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Monterey County Aug. 10, 1984).
37. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 4-
11, 16-19 (filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement of Decision filed Aug.
10, 1984) (available in Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
38. The court stated: "[tihe evidence thus discloses not the slightest possiblity
that Oakland would be permitted the ownership or control of a league franchise....
[Alcquisition of the team, without a reasonable probability of its having the right
to participate in the league, would not satisfy the public use requirement." Id. at
8. The court relied on Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984),
which states that deference to the legislature's determination of public use is not
required when it involves an impossibility. Id. at 2329 (1984); see City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 5-6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey
County filed July 16, 1984) (citing Midkifj).
39. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 7-
8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement
of Decision filed Aug. 10, 1984).
[Tihe Constitution and By-Laws of the National Football League provide
that only a profitmaking person or entity organized for the purpose of
operating a professional football club is eligible for membership; and
the primary purpose of the entity operating the franchise shall be the
operation of a professional football club.
Id. The Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL specifically provide that "[nlo cor-
poration, association, partnership or other entity not operated for profit nor any
charitable organization or entity not presently a member of the League shall be
eligible for membership." NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS
§ 3.2(a) (1984).
40. The court stated:
Section 1240.120 [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE] appears to restrict the taking
of property with the intent to transfer it to situations wherein such
property is necessary to make effective the use of other property acquired
to fulfill the principal purpose of the project. No other statutory provision
authorizes a taking with the intent to transfer, and the statute is the
sole source of Oakland's power to condemn property (Section 1230.020).
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 10 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
It would seem that either a finding that Oakland could acquire the Raiders on
a permanent basis with a reasonable probability of having the right to participate
in the league or a finding that the city could retransfer the team under state law
would satisfy the constitutional requirement of public use since no impossibility
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Second, the "local exercise of eminent domain over even one
member club of the NFL with its attendant permanent siting and
local control, would be an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce." 4' The court found that the exercise of eminent domain over
an NFL club would impermissibly burden interstate commerce, 2 in
violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution 3
because the taking of a franchise would unduly burden other NFL
members who depend on income from every team's gate receipts and
who share equally the proceeds from the league's television contracts."
Additionally, the court decided that the procedure followed by
the city in commencing the action violated both California's statutory
eminent domain procedures45 and the constitutional right of due
would exist and deference to the legislature would be appropriate. See supra note
42 and accompanying text. But neither of these findings would necessarily satisfy
California's statutory requirements of public use.
The California statutory requirements for public use were found to be an even
greater barrier to the proposed taking than the constitutional requirements. The
impossibility of taking the franchise and operating it as an NFL franchise, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text, and the impossibility of retransferring the
franchise under state law, see supra and accompanying text, were also found to
violate the California Legislature's requirement that there be a reasonable probability
that the public use be implemented within seven prospective years. See City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 7 (filed July 16,
1984) (adopted in court's Statement of Decision filed Aug. 10, 1984) (citing CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.360(d) (West 1982)). Furthermore, a court's own deter-
mination of the necessity for condemnation is appropriate under California statute
when the court finds that "gross abuse of discretion by the governing body has
influenced or affected the adoption or contents of the resolution of necessity."
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 17 (citing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255(b)). Given the court's finding that the resolution's
adoption and contents were influenced by gross abuse of discretion, id. at 18, it
went on to find that public interest and necessity did not require the acquisition
of the Raiders. Id. at 19. The court found a gross abuse of the City of Oakland's
discretion because:
[(1)] [t]he City wilfully failed to follow the procedure and to give notice
required by law[;] ... [(2)] [t]he action was filed for the arbitrary and
capricious purpose of restraining [t]he Raiders' relocation after bad faith
negotiations by the Coliseum Commission had failed to consummate a
new lease[;j . . . and [(3)] the lack of evidence before the governing body
when the resolution was adopted.
Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 22.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
44. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 20
(filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement of Decision filed Aug. 10, 1984).
45. The court found that the city violated the procedural requirements of
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
process.4 6 The court also concluded that this eminent domain action
was not in violation of any constitutional right to travel even if the
right were deemed to extend to business entities .4 The trial court's
judgment dismissing the City of Oakland's action with prejudice is
currently being appealed.4
8
III. The Power of Eminent Domain
Since Raiders is illustrative of the variety of legal obstacles that
may prevent a city from employing an eminent domain action to
take a sports franchise, a discussion of the various legal issues
presented in that case is warranted.
The power of eminent domain, which is inherent in a sovereign
state, is operative even without specific constitutional enumeration. 9
Limitations on that power are enumerated in both federal and state
constitutions as well as applicable regulations. 0 The constitutional
requirements that private property be taken only for public use and
California's Eminent Domain Law. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No.
76044, Tentative Decision at 12-16 (filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement
of Decision filed Aug. 10, 1984). But the court found that the procedure followed
was fundamentally unfair even without the statutory requirements that governed
the case, id. at 14, since the "City purposely commenced [the] action without
notice and without the adoption of a resolution of necessity." Id. at 13. The court
further found that the use of eminent domain as a means to confine the club and
influence it to negotiate a new and more favorable licensing agreement for use of
the Oakland Coliseum, under all the circumstances, was "arbitrary, capricious, a
gross abuse of discretion, and devoid of the fundamental fairness element of due
process." Id. at 14-16 (Coliseum withdrew proposal and presented Raiders with
less favorable one based on notion that Raiders were captive business; court found
such bad faith action to violate fundamental fairness element of due process).
46. Id. at 12-16.
47. Id. at 23-24.
48. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Judgment (filed Aug. 10),
appeal docketed, (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County Sept. 14, 1984). The Raiders
are currently playing their home games in Los Angeles.
49. See Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912);
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634, 304 N.W.2d
455, 459 (1981); First Broadcasting Corp. v. City of Syracuse, 78 A.D.2d 490,
494, 435 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (4th Dep't 1981); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
1.14[2] (3d ed. 1980); Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the
Parameters of Limitless Power, UTAH L. REV. 397, 397 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Defining the Parameters].
50. See City of Thorton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 194 Colo. 526,
534, 575 P.2d 382, 388-89 (1978); Fiesinger v. State, 88 Misc. 2d 557, 559, 388
N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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that just compensation be awarded5 are applicable to state govern-
ments through the fourteenth amendment.2 Since municipalities are
not sovereign entities, they have no inherent power of condemna-
tion. 3 Municipalities may, however, exercise this power when they
are expressly or impliedly authorized by the state to do so.
4
Consequently, to determine whether a city has the power to take
a sports franchise by eminent domain, it is necessary to consider
the federal Constitution as well as the relevant state constitution
and state eminent domain legislation.5
A. Property-Related Issues
1. Taking Intangible Property by Eminent Domain
While it has been argued that "the law of eminent domain does
not permit the taking of 'intangible property not connected with
51. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
52. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1984); Chicago,
Burlington R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-241 (1897); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676
(1982). Moreover, many states have adopted language similar or identical to that
of the fifth amendment in their own constitutions. See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 7.1[2], [3] (rev. 3d ed. 1976); Defining the Parameters, supra note 49,
at 397 n.7.
53. See Kohlasch v. New York State Thruway Auth., 482 F. Supp. 721, 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d
835, 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982); Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb.
608, 614, 254 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1977); see also Note Public Use, Private Use, and
Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 411-12 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Judicial Review].
54. See City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. Sup.
Ct. 1977).
Although the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State, a
municipal corporation has no such inherent power and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the Legislature. The power must be
conferred upon a municipality expressly or by necessary implication and
without such authorization it has no more right than any other corporation
to condemn property.
Id.
55. This Note will confine its analysis to a discussion of eminent domain under
the federal Constitution as it defines the outer limits of a state's eminent domain
powers. See Judicial Review, supra note 53, at 412 ("[g]enerally eminent domain
is a matter of state law, but its ultimate limits are prescribed . . .by the fourteenth
amendment").
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realty,' "56 it is clear that the federal Constitution does not prohibit
such a taking.5 7 Any such restriction, therefore, only can be based
on a statutory or state constitutional provision. 8
2. Property Rights in a Sports Franchise Amenable to
Acquisition Through a Successful Eminent Domain Action
Although a city can obtain intangible property by use of its eminent
domain power,5 9 a question remains as to whether the city can obtain
the right to participate in a sports league whose rules prohibit such
participation. For example, the NFL's Constitution and By-Laws
provide that only a profit-making person or entity with the purpose
of operating a professional football club is eligible for league mem-
bership.60 Based on these rules, the trial court in City of Oakland
56. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835,
837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982) (Raiders' argument which was not accepted by
court).
57. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2872-74 (1984). In Ruck-
elshaus, the Court held that the takings clause applies to regulatory takings of
intangible property in the form of trade secrets to the extent they are recognized
as property interests under state law. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1982)); see City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,
68, 646 P.2d 835, 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1982); see also I NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.1[2] (3d ed. 1980) ("[plersonal property is subject to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Intangible property, such as choses in
action, patent rights, franchises, charters or any other form of contract, are within
the scope of this sovereign authority as fully as land.") (emphasis added); Note,
Constitutional Law-California Eminent Domain Statute Allows The Taking of
Any Type of Property Interests-City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 6 WHITTIER
L. REV. 135, 149 (1984) ("the arguments supporting the proposition that any
property or ifiterest therein can be condemned are well founded in established
eminent domain practice and theory") [hereinafter cited as Property Interests].
58. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 73 (1966) ("Unless restricted by
constitutional or statutory provisions, the right of eminent domain encompasses
property of every kind and character, whether real or personal, or tangible or
intangible . . .").
There has been criticism of the California Supreme Court's finding that intangible
property in the form of a sports franchise can be taken under California state
law. See Defining the Parameters, supra note 51, at 409-10 (finding 1975 statutory
revision a reorganization and restatement of existing law which prohibited taking
of intangible property and finding California Supreme Court's decision "probably
incorrect"). However, there apparently is no disagreement that intangible property
can be taken under the federal constitution. See supra note 57.
State law could prohibit the taking of intangible property. See Property Interests,
supra note 57, at 149 (suggesting that sports franchises with no real connection
to real property provide legislatures with sufficient basis to fine-tune their statutes
and prevent attempts to take property of this sort).
59. See supra Section IV. A.
60. Any person, association, partnership, corporation, or other entity of
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v. Oakland Raiders6 found that, at least without joining the other
NFL franchise members in the action, Oakland could not acquire
the right to participate in the league. 62 Evidently, the court felt that
joinder was required because the taking would affect the other
owners' rights. 63 However, even if the other league members were
joined, they would receive compensation for the city's interference
with their ownership rights only if the league's rules were valid 64
good repute organized for the purpose of operating a professional football
club shall be eligible for membership except: . . . No corporation,
association, partnership or other entity not operated for profit nor any
charitable organization or entity not presently a member of the League
shall be eligible for membership.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 3.2 (1984); see City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 7 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) ("the Constitution and By-Laws of the
National Football League provide that only a profit-making person or entity or-
ganized for the purpose of operating a professional football club is eligible for
membership; and the primary purpose of the entity operating the franchise shall
be the operation of a professional football club . . ."). League members also must
approve a transfer of permanent ownership. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTI-
TUTION AND BYLAWS § 3.5(b) (1984) ("All sales, transfers or assignments except a
transfer referred to in Section 3.5 (c) hereof, shall only become effective if approved
by the affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths or 20, whichever is greater,
of the members of the League . . ."). However, the NFL Commissioner has
testified that a "brief interim ownership" by a city "would not be inconsistent
with the NFL Constitution .... ." City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.
3d 60, 73, 646 P.2d 835, 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 681 (1982). The National
Basketball Association requires a majority vote of the N.B.A. Governors for transfer
of a franchise. See A Look at NBA Changes, 71 No. 246 Star-Ledger (Newark)
108, col. 1 (Nov. 1, 1984).
61. No. 76044, Tentative Decision (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July
16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement of Decision Aug. 10, 1984).
62. Id. at 7-8 (1984) (on particular facts court found Oakland could "at most
acquire the club's physical assets and perhaps the player contracts").
63. Joinder would not appear to be required under California law, however,
since anyone can appear as a defendant and decisions will only bind persons named
in the complaint and properly served. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.230 and
legislative comment (West 1982).
64. Antitrust law may provide a basis for invalidating some league rules. For
example, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984), the court invalidated the NFL rule
requiring league approval for a franchise to move as an unreasonable restraint of
trade under federal antitrust laws. See Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of
Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157,
157 (1984) ("In December of 1981, National Football League Commissioner Pete
Rozelle testified before Congress that '[pirofessional sports leagues are at a point
where-because of the novel business form of a sports league-every league action,
every league business judgment and every league decision can be characterized as
an 'antitrust' issue.' ") (footnote omitted). State antitrust laws, however, do not
apply to professional sports since they are involved in interstate commerce. See
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and if the city's interference were so substantial that fairness required
the public, instead of the owner, to bear the burden.6 1
Additionally, there remains a question as to the city's ability to
acquire player contracts. 66 Since the right of eminent domain is
superior to the right to contract, 67 a city may acquire the rights to
tie players' services. According to contract principles, however, where
an employment contract contemplates the personal supervision and
direction of the employer, that duty of supervision may not be
delegated. 61 Consequently, where the players were hired to work
under the personal supervision and direction of a particular employer,
and that employer fails to perform his obligations, contract principles
prohibit the city from acquiring the rights to the players' services. 69
The failure of a subsequent employer to perform the conditions of
supervision discharges the players from further duties under their
contracts and gives them the right to declare themselves free agents. 70
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972) (baseball); Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball); Partee v. San Diego
Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d 378, 382-83, 668 P.2d 674, 677, 194 Cal. Rptr.
367, 370 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678 (1984) (football); HMC Management
Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700, 706-07 (La. Ct. App.
1979) (basketball); Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728-29 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (football). Note that only professional baseball enjoys an exemption
from federal antitrust laws. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). See generally
Note, The Effect of Collective Bargaining on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption,
12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 807 (1984) (discussing baseball's unique exemption from
antitrust law).
65. See generally Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1190-92 (Ct.
Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (discussing inverse condemnation and
various tests for determining whether regulation effects a taking). Diminution in
market value of the property is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish a taking.
Id. at 1191.
66. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at
8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984).
67. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 531-34 (1848); City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Monterey County filed July 16, 1984).
68. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 18-8, 18-25, at 640-41, 663 (2d
ed. 1978) ("[aln employer may not delegate his duty of supervision where the
contract contemplated personal supervision and direction of the employer"); 4
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865, at 438-39 (1951) (indicating contract contemplating
personal supervision can only be assigned if condition of supervision is performed).
69. See 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865, at 438-39 (1951); Sullivan, supra note
6, at 24.
70. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 24 ("[tjherefore, if the players contend that they
agreed to play for Al Davis and that the change in ownership will deprive them
of Al Davis' personal supervision and direction, it is possible that the players could
have the right to declare themselves free agents at the time the team changes
hands"); see supra note 68.
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3. Jurisdictional Limitations and the Situs of a Sports Franchise
Where a state statute limits a city's condemning power to property
inside its territorial limits,7' the determination of a team's situs could
deprive a city of its jurisdiction to condemn the team. This deter-
mination becomes more difficult because sports franchises are in-
tangible property.7 2 The California Supreme Court noted that "an
intangible right has no territorial 'situs in fact' " and that the " 'lo-
cation assigned to it depends on what action is to be taken with
reference to it.' " In Raiders, the California Supreme Court indicated
that a sports franchise's situs could be determined by the location
of the team's principal place of business, the designated site of its
home games and the primary location of the team's tangible property.74
Subsequently, a California appellate court "determined as a matter
of law that the only possible situs for the Raiders was the City of
Oakland" despite :evidence that the Raiders' general partners, some
of the coaches, players and a majority of season ticket holders did
not reside there. 75 Since it is difficult to imagine a situation where
a professional team's principal place of business, designated site for
home games and primary locale for tangible property would not be
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.050 (West 1982) ("local public
entity may acquire by eminent domain only property within its territorial limits
except where the power to acquire by eminent domain property outside its limits
is expressly granted by statute or necessarily implied as an incident of one of its
other statutory powers . . .").
72. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
73. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 74, 646 P.2d 835,
844, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 682 (1982); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.050 (West
1982).
74. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 74-75, 646 P.2d 835,
844, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 682 (1982). The court found these criteria to satisfy prima
facie the territorial restrictions but did not preclude the trial court from finding
otherwise on an appropriate factual record. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267,
274, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1st Dist. 1983).
The evidence relied upon by the trial court as sufficient to rebut the
prima facie case found by the Supreme Court is irrelevant. That evidence
was: the general partners do not reside in Oakland, nor do some of the
coaches, football players and other employees; the franchise territory of
Raiders under the NFL Constitution includes the City of Oakland and
the surrounding 75 miles; Raiders, under the NFL Constitution, have
the right to play teams in franchise territories across the United States;
Raiders share in NFL television contract proceeds "flowing in from across
the country;" and Raiders' "economic and recreational influence" was
not confined to Oakland.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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in the city claiming eminent domain, this decision, if followed, would
be dispositive.
However, using only the location of tangible assets to determine
the situs of a sports franchise should be avoided. For example, the
NFL Colts "fled Baltimore under the cloak of darkness" with eight
moving vans full of equipment bound for Indianapolis in an effort
to avoid Baltimore's eminent domain jurisdiction.16 While the Colts
apparently felt that moving tangible property alone was sufficient
to change the team's situs,7 7 this action does not satisfy the other
two criteria established in Raiders.78 Baltimore was still the team's
principal place of business since the team transacted no business in
Indianapolis prior to the date that the condemnation petition was
filed 79 and was still the designated site for Colts home games.
Moreover, as a practical matter, courts would be reluctant to allow
an owner to insulate a team against valid acquisition by moving its




Assuming that some sports franchise property is amenable to a
taking, it is clear that the property taken must be for a "public
use." Over the years, the term "public use" has been defined in
76. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954, 955 (7th Cir.
1984).
77. On March 27, 1984, Colts owner Robert Irsay learned that the Maryland
Senate passed a bill granting the City of Baltimore the power to acquire
the Colts by eminent domain. Irsay decided to move the team to In-
dianapolis and promptly executed a lease with the [Capital Improvement
Board]. The Colts fled Baltimore under the cloak of darkness; eight
moving vans full of Colts equipment arrived in Indianapolis on March
29.
On March 29, Maryland's governor signed into law the bill authorizing
Baltimore to acquire the Colts by condemnation. Baltimore filed a con-
demnation petition against the Colts on March 30 in Maryland state
court.
Id. at 955-56. The eminent domain action was subsequently removed to the federal
district court in Maryland. Id. at 956.
78. See supra notes 74-75, 77 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 77.
80. Cf. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at
24. (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County July 16, 1984) (expressing concern that if
right to travel limited power to condemn, owner could insulate intangible from
acquisition by merely asserting desire to relocate it).
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diverse and sometimes conflicting ways' enjoying both broad and
narrow interpretations.8 2 The broad view "equates public use with
public advantage or public benefit and tends to define as a public
use anything that benefits the state by creating jobs, promoting land
sales, developing natural resources or increasing industrial activity." 3
The broad view prevailed through the first half of 'the nineteenth
century, but temporarily gave way to the narrow view and reemerged
in the twentieth century.84 The intervening narrow view advocated
a "use-by-public" test which gave courts more control over the
exercise of the eminent domain power delegated to private enterprises
by requiring that the public actually use the condemned property.85
Although the traditional broad view has reemerged in the twentieth
century8 6 and the Supreme Court has repudiated the narrow "use-
by-public" test,87 some state courts still define public use according
to the narrow view. 88
Application of the broad interpretation of "public use" is necessary
to accommodate the increasing role of government in meeting public
needs.8 9 However, arguably, under the present amorphous definition,
81. Defining the Parameters, supra note 49, at 402.
82. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § VII D,
at 493 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
83. Defining the Parameters, supra note 49, at 403 (footnote omitted).
84. NowAK, supra note 82, § VII D, at 493.
85. Id.; see Defining the Parameters, supra note 49, at 404.
86. Defining the Parameters, supra note 49, at 404-05.
87. The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn
that taking as having only a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public. "It is not essential that the entire community, nor even
any considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or participate in any im-
provement in order [for it] to constitute a public use."
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1984) (quoting Rindge Co.
v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. at 707); see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)
("[h]ere one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment
of the area . . . the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress
alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established ... "); Mt. Vernon
Cotton Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
88. Defining the Parameters, supra note 49, at 405 (citing Florida and South
Carolina cases).
89. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 72, 646 P.2d 835,
842, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 680 (1982); Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8,
15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953) ("[a] public use defies absolute definition, for it
changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, [and]
changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government . . ."); Roe v.
Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 207, 199 A.2d 834, 842 (1964) ("[tjhe concept of public use
is a broad one . . . [and to] be serviceable it must expand when necessary to
encompass changing public needs . .. ).
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ahnost any taking could be deemed to be for a public use.9" A prop-
erty owner's chance of successfully contesting an eminent domain
action is not only limited by the broad view of public use that most
courts adopt9 but also by courts' reluctance to review legislative deter-
minations of public use.
2. Limited Review
While the Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment's
public use provision applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment,9 2 the Court has performed an extremely limited role in
reviewing legislative declarations that a particular condemnation is
for a public use. 9 The Court recognized, in Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff,94 that it had "never held a compensated taking
to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause" where the power of
eminent domain was "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose." 95 The Court's justification for such limited review was
that "it [would] not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judg-
90. See Are there Limits, supra note 12, at 108, which states: "[tihe constitutional
limitation of public use has been defined so broadly that it is no longer a restraint.
Consequently, property rights are endangered." Id.
91. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
92. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980)
(citing Chicago Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)
and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978)); see
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 n.7 (1984).
93. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546, 551-52 (1946); Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
The decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff all but prohibits
courts from independently assessing whether appropriations of property
or regulatory takings serve a public use. Similarly, although courts in
regulatory takings cases nominally must continue to decide whether "prop-
erty" has been "taken," the decision in Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co.
[104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984)] delegates to legislatures many of the critical
determinations about the definition of property entitlements and the
reasonableness of investment-backed expectations in property.
Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 225-26 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Leading Cases]. "Whereas Midkiff limits the role of courts in assessing
the public uses of takings, Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co. limits the ability of courts
to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred in the first instance." Id.
at 228.
94. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) (holding that public use clause did not prohibit
Hawaii from taking title in real property from lessors, with just compensation and
transferring it to lessees in order to reduce land oligopoly).
95. Id. at 2329-30. The Court, however, noted that it had invalidated a com-
pensated taking of property where the order was not claimed to be a taking for
public use in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896). 104
S. Ct. at 2329.
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ment as to what constitute[d] a public use 'unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.' "96 Additionally, courts generally are
reluctant to review socioeconomic legislation. 97 Consequently, since
the Court deems eminent domain actions to be socioeconomic in
nature, 98 judicial review of a legislative determination of what con-
stitutes a public use is unlikely.
Great deference and a presumption of constitutionality must be
accorded to socio-economic legislation in situations where the leg-
islation neither violates a specific constitutional prohibition nor op-
erates with prejudice against discrete and insular minorities. 99 Since
the public use clause has been interpreted as a constitutional pro-
hibition,' °° a court could apply a more stringent standard of review
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
97. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (Court
refused to perform substantive due process analysis of social or economic legislation).
98. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (1984) ("empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of
other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal
courts . . .").
In its two major takings cases last Term, Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff [104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984)] and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., [104
S. Ct. 2862 (1984)] the Supreme Court completed a trend toward placing
takings largely outside the realm of judicial review by treating govern-
mental expropriation of property as simply another form of socioeconomic
regulation. Both cases limit the role of courts and expand that of leg-
islatures in enforcing the fifth amendment's command that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
Leading Cases, supra note 93, at 225-26.
99. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 and accom-
panying text (1938). Footnote 4 limits the Court's holding by stating:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth .... It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation .... Nor
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial
minorities ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi-
norities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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to eminent domain legislation despite its socioeconomic attributes.' 0
Without providing such review, the public use clause will be deprived
of its value as a limitation on governmental takings.' 2 Moreover,
Midkiff's limit on judicial review applies only to the public use
clause of the federal Constitution and can be avoided where a state
constitution's public use requirement is interpreted narrowly. 03 Ig-
noring the federal standard °"3 might be provident in light of arguments
that land use is a traditional local concern. 05
101. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see
supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
102. See Judicial Review, supra note 53, at 425, which states:
The public use clause protects a property owner from certain government
transactions. And however uncertain its boundaries, it is explicit in the
Constitution and must be interpreted in each case if it is to have any
content at all. Interpretation, in turn, implies limits on government, for
to accept any proposal as a public use is to treat the constitutional
language as surplusage.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, increased judicial review may be warranted where local decision-making
bodies attempt to condemn property for third parties. Id. at 432-34. But see Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 n.7 (1984) ("[it would be ironic
to find that state legislation is subject to greater scrutiny under the incorporated
'public use' requirement than is congressional legislation under the express mandate
of the Fifth Amendment . .. ").
103. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965)
("even though a state court's opinion relies on similar provisions in both the State
and Federal Constitutions, the state constitutional provision has been held to provide
an independent and adequate ground for decision depriving this Court of jurisdiction
to review the state judgment") (citations omitted); see also Brennan, State Con-
stitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495
(1977) ("more and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts
of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even
more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased"); Judicial
Review, supra note 53, at 441 ("As a general proposition, a state court interpreting
its own constitution has more latitude than a federal court interpreting an identically
worded federal constitutional provision . .. ").
104. In the sphere of eminent domain, courts have been reluctant to interpret
state constitutions more strictly than the federal constitution. See Williams &
Doughty, Studies on Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29
RUTGERs L. REV. 73, 84 n.34 and accompanying text (1975) ("most state courts
followed the Supreme Court's lead . . ."). Courts are not so reluctant to interpret
state constitutions more strictly than the federal Constitution in other areas of the
law. See Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State
Constitutions: The Case For Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 252 (1981) ("doctrine
of substantive due process is very much alive in the state courts").
105. See Judicial Review, supra note 55, at 444 (" 'state courts' adherence to
federal standards of review and federal rules of law is inconsistent with the active
role that they should play in local land use matters ... ").
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3. Public Use Applied to Sports Franchises
While no court has held that a municipality can acquire or operate
a professional sports team,' °6 the broad definition and the limited
review applied to legislative determinations of public use'017 indicate
that the limitation is broad enough to encompass such a taking. 08
Recreation has been deemed a legitimate public purpose which jus-
tified acquisitions of land to be used for baseball fields,' °9 county
fairs, 10 and municipal stadiums."'
Cities and states increasingly have become involved in attract-
ing sports teams to their area by making loans," 2 attempting to pur-
chase teams"3 or building stadiums and offering attractive
106. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 70, 646 P.2d 835,
841, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 679 (1982) ("[nlo case anywhere of which we are aware
has held that a municipality can acquire and operate a professional football team,
although we are informed that the City of Visalia owns and operates a professional
Class A baseball franchise ... apparently, its right to do so never has been
challenged in court .... ").
107. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
108. See Leading Cases, supra note 93, at 231 ("[plublic authorities may now
be able to condemn property ranging from football teams to steel mills").
109. See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 333 P.2d 745
(1959) (holding contract whereby city agreed to convey land to Dodgers baseball
club for erection of stadium was valid since city received benefits serving legitimate
public purposes). Note, however, that this case did not involve an acquisition by
eminent domain. Id.
110. See County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d
80, 38 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1964) (acquired property to be used for parking at county
fair by eminent domain).
111. See New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super.
457, 556-58, 566, 292 A.2d 580, 635-36, 641 (upholding law creating specific public
entity to build sports complex, through eminent domain if necessary), aff'd, 61
N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972). "Indeed, as long ago as 1930 an Ohio appellate
court discovered numerous examples of such publicly owned facilities across the
country: 'In fact, within the forty-eight states of the Union ninety-three municipal
stadiums have been erected, or are in the process of erection . . . .' " City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 71, 646 P.2d 835, 842, 183 Cal. Rptr.
673, 680 (1982) (citing Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 25, 171
N.E. 606, 607 (1938)). Both Candlestick Park and Anaheim Stadium are municipally
owned. Id. at 71, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680. Shea Stadium and
Yankee Stadium also are examples of municipally owned stadiums. See Barbanel,
Shea Stadium Won't Get Artificial Turf, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at B22, col.
3.
112. See Raiders Paid $3M by L.A. as Part of Loan, 71 No. 276 Star-Ledger
(Newark) 27, col. 5 (Dec. 1, 1984).
113. See Louisiana Governor Intent on Keeping Team at Superdome-Saints for
Sale: $75M Price Tag, 71 No. 273 Star-Ledger (Newark) 86, col. 3 (Nov. 28, 1984)
("Itihe New Orleans Saints can' be had for $75 million and, apparently, the state
of Louisiana wants to have them as much as ever"); see also Jaffe, Authorization
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leases. 1 4 If these activities are deemed to be for the public's use,
then the acquisition of a sports franchise by eminent domain may
be a logical means to accomplish this public purpose." 5
Since a city's condemnation of a sports franchise serves the purpose
of encouraging recreational and spectator activity, 1 6 promoting civic
pride"17 and stimulating the local economy,"8 it probably would satisfy
the public use requirement." 9 However, while the Supreme Court
has deferred to legislative determinations of public use, it would
apply a higher standard of review when deference to a legislature's
public use determination is " 'shown to involve an impossibility.' "120
or when the use is " 'palpably without reasonable foundation.' ,,l2,
Consequently, if the taking of a sports franchise constituted an
impossibility or was without a reasonable foundation, it would be
subject to a higher degree of scrutiny. 2
for Ball Park Placed on the Fast Track, 71 No. 288 Star-Ledger (Newark) 60, col.
1 (Dec. 13, 1984). The bill would permit the New Jersey Sports and Exposition
Authority to buy sports franchises as a means of keeping them from leaving the
state. The bill subsequently was enacted. See Jaffe, Kean Enacts Baseball Effort,
Hails Jersey as Sports Capital, 71 No. 294 Star-Ledger (Newark) 1, col. 1 (Dec.
19, 1984).
114. See Jaffe, Authorization for Ball Park Placed on the Fast Track, 71 No.
288 Star-Ledger (Newark) 60, col. 1 (Dec. 13, 1984) (Sports Authority had pre-
liminary talks with certain baseball club's representatives about relocating to New
Jersey pursuant to pending bill); Saints Sold for $64 Million, Seek New Lease, 72
No. 13 Star-Ledger (Newark) 59, col. 1 (Mar. 13, 1985) ("sale was contingent on
four things-the new lease, approval by the NFL, a virtual donation of state land
across Lake Pontchartrain for a training facility, and removal of taxes on all
Superdome events . .. ").
115. The California Supreme Court posed, but did not definitively answer, the
question of whether "the obvious difference between managing and owning the
facility in which the game is played, and managing and owning the team which
plays in the facility, [is] legally substantial .... ." City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 72, 646 P.2d 835, 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 680 (1982).
116. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
117. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
118. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
119. But see Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 18, 215 A.2d 894, 896
(1966) (city by engaging "in the private business of promoting sports events"
through operation and ownership of team might be engaging in private rather than
public use because city would take part in business aspect).
120. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984) (quoting Old
Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
121. Id. at 2329 (1984) (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R., 160
U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
122. The standard would be stricter than the usual test of whether the eminent
domain power exercised is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984); see Leading Cases,
supra note 93, at 228.
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While the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to uphold the taking
of neighborhood properties for reconveyance to General Motors
Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant12 1 might
lead some to believe that almost no taking would be struck down
on public use grounds, courts might be more likely to strike down
an attempt to take an ongoing business. 24 The taking of a business
is conceptually very different from traditional takings of land. Courts
might find unreasonable a legislative determination that it is necessary
to condemn a business to achieve various benefits for the public.
25
Legislatures could be found to have abused their discretion since
the validation of such a taking might open the floodgates of litigation
123. The court upheld the taking since the benefit received by the municipality
was a clear and significant one and since the benefit to the private interest was
merely incidental. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich.
616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). The city condemned the land so that General Motors
would build an assembly complex in the city after its proposed close-down of its
Cadillac and Fisher body plants. Id. at 636, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting). The Michigan Supreme Court, however, purported to use a heightened
level of scrutiny stating: "[wihere, as here, the condemnation power is exercised
in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects
with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest
being advanced." Id. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60. The building of the new
General Motors plant was estimated to result in the employment of 6,150 persons
in the factory itself as well as the generation of other employment, business and
tax revenue but the costs of the project were estimated to equal nearly $200,000,000
and to involve the displacement of 3,438 persons and the destruction of 1,176
structures. Id. at 645 n.15, 304 N.W.2d at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 23, which states that the cost to the city was $20
million and the land was sold for $8 million. The General Motors plant has never
been built. Id.
It has been suggested that the non-economic rights of the homeowners in Poletown
may have led the Supreme Court to decide the case differently. See Leading Cases,
supra note 93, at 233. The rationale is that either the political power lost by the
residents or the unrelievable pain caused by the loss of their homes might make
money compensation inadequate so that just compensation could not be awarded
and, therefore, the Court could declare the taking unconstitutional. Id. at 233-35.
124. Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion in City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 76, 646 P.2d 835, 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 683 (1982),
illustrates a reluctance to allow a taking of an ongoing business. Chief Justice Bird
felt compelled to concur in the Raiders decision because the court could not question
the wisdom of such a taking unless "the municipality acted in an arbitrary or
capricious fashion, or its act represents a 'gross abuse of discretion . . . ' " and
the limited record before the court, in its review of the grant of summary judgment,
did not show a violation of these standards. Id. at 79, 646 P.2d at 846-47, 183
Cal. Rptr. at 685. However, Chief Justice Bird had "serious misgivings about the
wisdom of the city's action and the possible future ramifications of a holding that
the State has the power to take an ongoing business to prevent it from leaving a
particular area .... ." Id. at 79, 646 P.2d at 847, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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and result in a trend toward government coercively taking ownership
of the means of production. Such a trend is unlikely, however, since
a city could replace most of the benefits derived from particular
businesses by devoting its resources to attracting other similar busi-
nesses to the locale.
Even if courts refuse to defer to legislative determinations of
necessity for the taking of normal ongoing businesses, the likelihood
of a city's successful condemnation of a sports franchise may depend
on its ability to distinguish sports franchises from other types of
businesses. Arguably, sports franchises are unique and different from
other businesses. 2 6 Professional sports teams can be distinguished
from other businesses because: (1) the public develops a strong
interest in professional sports franchises, and they provide a source
of local pride;127 (2) they provide the public with entertainment and
encourage recreational and spectator activity; 28 (3) cities and mu-
nicipalities often lease stadiums at prices which do not cover stadium
construction costs; 129 and (4) they are a source of substantial revenues
for the community in which they play. 30 While it is conceivable
that an ordinary business could satisfy some of these distinctions,
it is unlikely that it could meet all four. Therefore, the readiness
of courts to adopt these distinctions may be the key to the successful
condemnation of a sports franchise.
C. Just Compensation
The fifth amendment's mandate that just compensation be paid
for private property taken for public use'' applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.3 2 Just compensation generally
is measured by the fair market value of the property taken.1
3
126. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and former San Francisco Mayor
Joseph Alioto feel that it is a bad analogy to compare a sports franchise to a
steel plant. See The Eagles Leave Philadelphia, ABC News Nightline, Dec. 12,
1984, Transcript of Show #928 at 6-7 (available in Fordham Urban Law Journal
office).
127. See infra note 186 and accompanying text..
128. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
129. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
131. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
132. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
133. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 509 (1979). The time
as of which compensation is assessed varies among jurisdictions. See 3 NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.5 (3d ed. 1974). Under California law:
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Evidence other than fair market value generally is admissible only
"when market value has been too difficult to find, or when its
application would result in manifest injustice to [an] owner or [the]
public .... 11114 Thus, the question that naturally arises is whether
sports franchises have a readily determinable fair market value such
that consideration of other evidence, such as the cost to replace the
team, would be inappropriate.
Fair market value is defined as the property's worth when put to
its highest and best use, including potential uses that can be antic-
ipated with reasonable certainty.3 5 Therefore, a determination of a
sports franchise's value could be based on evidence of its worth if
operated in another city. While capitalization of future profits is
an acceptable method of determining fair market value,' 36 the more
common measure is the price a willing buyer would pay to a willing
seller. 3 Nevertheless, an owner of a condemned sports franchise
the date of valuation is the date of commencement of the proceeding,
if the trial of the issue of compensation takes place within one year
from the date of filing the action. Where no deposit has been made and
the date of trial is more than one year from the date of filing, the date
of valuation is the date of trial unless the delay was the fault of the
defendant.
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 24 n.10 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110-
1263.150) (emphasis in original).
134. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950);
see City of Atlanta v. Hadjisimos, 168 Ga. App. 840, 840-41, 310 S.E.2d 570,
572 (1983) ("Testimony other than that of a property's fair market value is generally
admissible only when the property has some unique or special value so that fair
market value will not afford just and adequate compensation . ..").
135. State, Through Dep't of Highways v. Luling Indus. Park, Inc., 443 So. 2d
672, 677 (La. Ct. App. 1983); see NOWAK, supra note 82, § VII E, at 495-96.
136. Ozark Gas Transmission Systems v. Barclay, 662 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1983). Note that this court allowed the capitalization of income approach
in determining the fair market value of real estate used as a peach and apple
orchard. Id. The court allowed the capitalization approach because the prospective
revenue was derived from the property itself rather than from a business operated
on the land and since a willing buyer would consider these revenues in estimating
the property's market value. Id. This distinction would not preclude the owner of
a sports franchise from using this approach since the profits are derived directly
from the property condemned, here the business entity itself, and relocation will
not enable the owner to continue reaping such profits.
137. While the Supreme Court usually employs the fair market value standard
and allows a condemnee to receive " 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to
a willing seller' at the time of the taking . . ." as compensation for his loss, it
is not the sole measure of compensation. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1978) (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943)); see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Weaver, 310 S.E.2d 338, 341 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
1984).
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might argue that fair market value is insufficient compensation since
the purpose of awarding fair market value is to allow the condemnee
to enter the market with the sum awarded and replace the condemned
property with a substitute, identical in kind and quality. 3 ' Sports
franchises are scarce in number and are not readily replaceable. As
a result, the application of the fair market value rule, which "pre-
supposes the existence of a broad market with frequent trading in
articles of an identical character with the article lost,"' 3 9 is inap-
propriate.
The owner of a sports franchise should be allowed to introduce
evidence of the price he must pay to replace his team with a similar
franchise within a reasonable period of time. This cost might be
higher than the price paid by prior franchise purchasers due to the
infrequency of sales and the possible reluctance to sell to a particular
buyer who might have plans to move the team to a different lo-
cation.' ° Awarding the condemnee the replacement value of his
property would enable him to maintain his livelihood and to retain
the status appurtenant to owning a professional sports franchise. 41
Even if the condemnor were successful in proving that there was a
sufficient market for sports franchises, 42 replacement value still might
be a fairly accurate measure of damages as it should arguably
approximate the team's fair market value.
138. Cf. McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 183, 159 N.E.
902, 904 (1928) ("strict rule that market value or market price is an exclusive
measure of damage does not apply" to buildings used as brewery during prohibition).
139. Id. at 182, 159 N.E. at 904 (citations omitted). Market value would be an
inappropriate measure of value when there is no ascertainable market value for
the property or where the use of market value would cause injustice to the owner.
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)).
140. See Tose Announces Eagles to Stay in Philadelphia, 71 No. 291 Star-Ledger
(Newark) at 2, col. 5 (Dec. 16, 1984) (Eagles football team owner, Leonard Tose,
said: "[t]hroughout these difficult negotiations, my foremost desire has been to
keep the Eagles in Philadelphia"); see also Bucks on the Market, N.Y. Post, Feb.
6, 1985, at 61, col. 1 (Milwaukee Bucks basketball team owner said "[wlhile we
will discuss the sale of the club to any interested party . . .Milwaukee-based offers
will have the highest priority").
141. Al Davis, the owner of the Raiders was quoted as saying: "[tihe team's
my life, it's been my life, my work for 20 years." Lindsey, Oakland Cites Eminent
Domain In Effort to Regain Football Team, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1983, at 14,
col. 5.
142. Recent sales of professional football teams have been for similar prices and
might enhance the argument that there is a readily determinable fair market value.
The Dallas Cowboys, the Denver Broncos, the New Orleans Saints and the Phil-
adelphia Eagles were recently sold for $72 million, $70 million, $64 million and
$65 million, respectively. Anderson, One Opinion for Oakland, N.Y. Times, March
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A condemnee also might argue that his team constitutes unique
property made up of the personal service contracts of specific athletes
and that such an asset is irreplaceable, and no market value can
be assessed. 14 3 This argument, however, might leave the condemnee
at a loss for a measure of just compensation. 144 Nevertheless, a more
innovative measure of a team's value might be given credence through
such an argument.
While the Supreme Court, in interpreting the fifth amendment's
compensation requirement, has "sought to put the owner of con-
demned property 'in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property
had not been taken,' ,1145 it, generally, has adjusted compensation
downward rather than upward from the market value. 14 6 When the
government's claim of public use in the condemnation of sports
franchises is less traditional and more tenuous, a more liberal attitude
toward compensation should be adopted to prevent the usurpation
of power by legislative bodies and to curtail the use of eminent
22, 1984, at B14, col. 1; Saints Sold for $64 million, Seek New Lease, 72 No. 13
Star-Ledger (Newark) at 59, col. 1 (Mar. 13, 1985); Tose: My Idea to Stay in
Philly, 72 No. 13 Star-Ledger (Newark) at 59, col. 1 (1985). The New Orleans
Saints originally were offered for sale at a price of $75 million. See Saints for
Sale: $75M Price Tag, 71 No. 273 Star-Ledger (Newark) at 86, col. 3 (Nov. 28,
1984). One writer, however, has suggested that "the Raiders' franchise could prove
to be worth well in excess of $100 million" based on ticket sales, network television
and cable television proceeds, concessions and local radio contracts. Sullivan, supra
note 6, at 23-24.
143. " 'Proof of a single sale is not enough to establish a market value.'
McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 182, 159 N.E. 902, 904 (1928)
(quoting T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 244, at 495
(9th ed. 1920)).
144. It has been suggested that "[j]ust compensation is a flexible, equitable
doctrine that empowers courts to declare certain actions unconstitutional when
compensation is not 'just'-thus insuring that takings do not result in manifest
injustice." See Leading Cases, supra note 93, at 234. It remains to be seen, however,
whether a taking of property that is inextricably part of the individual or which
aggregates political.power will be struck down on a theory that no form of money
compensation would be just. Id. at 233-35; see also supra note 123 (discussing
suggestion that noneconomic rights of homeowners may influence Supreme Court's
decision in takings case). That being so, it appears unlikely that a court would
strike down a taking of a sports franchise thinking no amount of money com-
pensation would be just. However, the difficulty in valuing a sports franchise might
persuade a court to permit broad evidence to be introduced on the theory that it
is better to overcompensate than to undercompensate the condemnee for his loss
based on the just compensation clause.
145. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979) (quoting
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
146. See id. at 512-13, n.7; see, e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332-
34 (1949).
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domain in areas beyond the realms intended by the drafters of the
fifth amendment.
IV. Right to Travel
Logically, the commencement of an action in eminent domain for
the purpose of preventing a team from relocating raises the issue
of whether business entities, like natural persons, enjoy a consti-
tutional right to travel.'14 Although the right to travel is not found
in any specific constitutional provision, 48 it has been "firmly es-
tablished and repeatedly recognized.' ' 49 Originally, this right was
viewed as a right to travel to the seat of government to petition
for redress of grievances,' 50 but, in recent years, it has been viewed
more broadly. 5' Since it is at least partially based on the commerce
147. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 22-
24 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984).
148. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). Justice Harlan, dissenting
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), noted that:
[o]pinions of this Court and of individual Justices have suggested four
provisions of the Constitution as possible sources of a right to travel
enforceable against the federal or state governments: the Commerce
Clause; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2; the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The Court has not, however,
seen fit to ascribe the source of this fundamental right to any particular constitutional
provision. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The failure to
identify the source of the right has obscured its limits. The right of interstate travel
is judged by a higher standard than is the right to travel abroad. See Califano v.
Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978) (justifications for penalizing right to travel
abroad need not be compelling, as with right of interstate travel, but rather rationally
based).
149. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
150. Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).
[A citizen] has the right to come to the seat of the government to assert
any claim he may have upon the government, or to transact any business
he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to
engage in administering its functions .... [Tihis right is in its nature
independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in
the exercise of it.
Id. at 44.
151. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (Court invalidated
statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than a year since "the
purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents ... is constitutionally imper-
missible"). Justice Brennan noted "that the nature of our Federal Union and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free
to travel throughout ... (the] land uninhibited by regulations which unnecessarily
burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629.
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clause,' arguably, the right applies to business entities.153
One court already has determined that, even if the right to travel
applied to business entities, it was not a valid objection to a taking
by eminent domain. 5 4 The court stated that: "the fact that such
acquisition of property prevents its relocation, or interferes with the
desire of its owner to move to another location, would not be a
valid objection to the taking."' 55 The court noted that a contrary
result would enable an owner of an intangible to "insulate it from
acquisition by merely asserting a desire to relocate it. ' '156
V. Commerce Clause
The Constitution's commerce clause, 5 7 which impliedly limits the
power of states to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate
commerce,' 58 is a formidable barrier to cities seeking to take sports
franchises by eminent domain. 5 9 However, the Supreme Court has
152. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (citing Edwards v. Cal-
ifornia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)).
153. If the right to travel is deemed to extend to business entities based on the
Commerce Clause, see supra note 148 and accompanying text, it would not preclude
congressional legislation to restrict the movement of sports franchises, see supra
note 126 and infra section VI, since it specifically grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. See Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a
Constitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117, 120 (1975) (commerce clause "has its
limitations" as constitutional source of right to travel since "it acts only as a
restraint against the states"); see also Note, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to
Travel, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1141 n.63 (1975) ("the modern right to travel
cannot be grounded in the commerce clause or the nature of the Union, because
many recent decisions forbid federal government action restricting travel ...").
154. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 24
(Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's Statement
of Decision filed August 10, 1984).
Even if such a right extends to business entities, there is a conceptual problem
in finding that a business entity's right to travel is violated when a city takes
ownership of that business by eminent domain. It would seem that a condemned
business would still have the right to relocate, the only difference being that the
city, as owner, would have the option of exercising that right.
155. Id. at 24.
156. Id.
157. Clause 3 provides in pertinent part: "[Congress shall have power] [tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ...... U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
158. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal-
ifornia, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981).
159. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at
20-22 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (adopted in court's
Statement of Decision filed Aug. 10, 1984). The court held that acquisition of the
Raiders' franchise by eminent domain "would unduly burden and obstruct interstate
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long recognized that "in the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some meas-
ure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate
it." 6 Thus, a commerce clause analysis is aimed at determining
when state actions impermissibly burden or affect interstate com-
merce.
In determining whether a state action violates the commerce clause,
under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., a court considers: (1) whether
the statute operates in a discriminatory manner; (2) whether the
burden on interstate commerce is excessive in relation to its putative
local benefits' despite the evenhanded operation of the regulation;
and (3) whether alternative means could promote the local purpose
as well without placing as great a burden on interstate commerce. 161
If a state or local statute is within any of these criteria, it may be
held unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 162 However, a state
or local government's power is not subject to the restraints of the
commerce clause when it enters the market as a participant. 6
3
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Id. at
20.
160. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)
(quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)).
161. The general rule that emerges is that:
[wihere the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
162. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
163. The Court in White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983), stated that: "Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, therefore, stand for the prop-
osition that when a state or local government enters the market as a participant
it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 208; see Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794 (1976). The test of whether a state is acting as a market participant is "whether
the challenged 'program constituted direct participation in the market.' " Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980); see White v. Mass. Council of Constr.
Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983) (reaffirming principle that direct participation
in market is necessary to be market participant).
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As a result, the issue of whether a state or local government, in
exercising its sovereign' 64 power of eminent domain, is acting pursuant
to its role as regulator or as a market participant is the crucial
determinant of whether commerce clause analysis is necessary at
all.165 When a government seeks to condemn a sports franchise, it
has chosen neither to regulate 66 that team by passing legislation
prohibiting it from moving nor to purchase the business on the open
market thereby becoming a market participant. 67 Instead, the gov-
ernment's action places it between the regulator and the market
participant because it uses its eminent domain power to cause a
forced sale which it could not do as an ordinary market participant.
By choosing this middle course, a state might hope to obtain certain
advantages in the market. First, it might keep the team at its present
location despite the fact that regulation to this end would be subject
to commerce clause analysis. Furthermore, a city could force a sale,
which it could not do as a mere market participant. The team could
be retransferred subject to the condition that it not be moved, and
as a result, the capital outlay could be recovered by the governmental
unit in a relatively short period of time. 16  However, since the
Supreme Court recently held that the power of eminent domain is
coterminous with the state's police power, 69 it appears that eminent
domain proceedings will be treated in the same manner as regulatory
action. Thus, the city should not be permitted to employ this middle
164. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the power of eminent
domain is an inherent aspect of sovereignty and as such may deserve greater
protection from invalidation under the commerce clause.
165. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
166. Takings occur in two ways: (1) when a public body formally condemns
property and "obtains the fee simple pursuant to eminent domain proceedings,"
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1190 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1017 (1982), and (2) when governmental actions under the police power
"destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good"
and thereby constitute a regulatory taking. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Leading Cases,
supra note 93, at 226 n.4 (discussing two types of takings).
167. See Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 18, 215 A.2d 894, 896
(1966) (court noted that city by operating and owning team would be engaging
"in the private business of promoting sports events"); see also Are There Limits,
supra note 12, at 89-90 (discussing Martin). By owning and operating a team, a
city would meet the definition of a market participant since it would be directly
participating in the market. See supra note 163.
168. If a city were to immediately retransfer the team to a third party it would
not be acting as a market participant since it would not be directly participating
in the market. See supra note 163.
169. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984).
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course and should be treated as a market participant only after it
actually acquires the team.
Since professional sports franchises are involved in interstate com-
merce, 170 a city's effort to acquire a team by eminent domain will
survive attack under the commerce clause only if it passes the test
set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.7 ' A city that tries to prevent
a team from leaving by exercising its power of eminent domain can
be viewed as placing barriers to the production of entertainment.
7 2
In essence, the city wants to insure that production of the enter-
tainment occur only in its locale on those occasions when the team
is designated as the home team. The product may then be introduced
into interstate commerce by various media including television and
radio broadcasts. It is clear that if a city were to introduce legislation
prohibiting a team from leaving its location it would violate the
commerce clause since a "[sltate is without power to prevent privately
owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate
commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local
demands or because they are needed by the people of the State.'
7
170. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972) (state antitrust laws not applicable
to baseball due to burden on interstate commerce); Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state antitrust laws not applicable
to basketball since interstate commerce); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football
Co., 34 Cal. 3d 378, 383-84, 668 P.2d 674, 677-78, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367, 370-71
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678 (1984) (state antitrust laws not applicable to
football); HMC Management v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700,
706-07 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (state antitrust laws not applicable to basketball);
Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(state antitrust laws not applicable to football). Note, however, that baseball is the
only sport that is presently exempt from federal antitrust laws. Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); see supra note 64.
171. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
172. Despite the fact that member clubs of sports leagues compete to a certain
degree, they are involved in a joint venture organized for the purpose of providing
entertainment nationwide. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative
Decision at 21 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (citing Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984)).
173. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1928) (citing
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923) and Oklahoma v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911)). In Foster-Fountain Packing, the Court
invalidated the conditions imposed on the interstate movement of meat and other
parts of shrimp under the Louisiana Shrimp Act, since the provisions are not
intended to retain shrimp for consumption and use within the State of Louisiana
but rather to favor the canning of the meat and manufacture of the bran in
Louisiana. Id. at 13. One factor distinguishing shrimp from sports franchises is
that shrimp are deemed to be owned and controlled by the state for the benefit
of its people. Louisiana in Foster Packing, however, released its hold and terminated
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Consequently, the exercise of eminent domain to take a sports
franchise would operate to discriminate in favor of local interests
since it would necessarily deprive other locations of this privately
owned property. 7 4
In applying the Pike balancing test, a court must weigh the putative
local benefits against the burden on interstate commerce. 75 The
putative local benefits include providing the community with a source
of entertainment, 76 pride,' 77 jobs 78 and substantial revenues. 179 The
superior court of Monterey County determined that these benefits
were outweighed by the burden on interstate commerce since such
a taking would disrupt the balance of economic bargaining on
stadium leases throughout the nation.'80
Lastly, a city might be able to purchase or aid a private person
in the purchase of a team on the market and thereby promote its
local purpose without placing as great a burden on interstate com-
merce.' 8' Such a purchase would not involve the coercion inherent
in an exercise of eminent domain and would, therefore, be less
burdensome to interstate commerce.
Since the local exercise of eminent domain to prevent sports
franchise relocation arguably would violate the commerce clause,
legislation to protect a city's interests in restricting franchise relo-
its control over shrimp taken "by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the
products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce .... ." Id. at 13.
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
176. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
177. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
178. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 21-
22 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984).
181. The existence of less burdensome alternatives is a sufficient justification for
striking down state or local legislation as a violation of the commerce clause. See,
e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); see also supra note 161 and accompanying
text. The provision of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws that requires members
to be profitmaking persons or entities might prevent cities from purchasing an NFL
team on the market. See supra notes 39, 60, 64 and accompanying text. However,
a city's brief interim ownership might not be inconsistent with the NFL requirement.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Even if a sports league's rules are valid
under antitrust law, see supra note 64, and are deemed to prohibit a city from
owning a franchise for any period of time, a city could still aid a private person
or entity who wished to purchase a team and locate it in that city. Arguably, such;
action would be less burdensome to interstate commerce than acquisition of a team
by eminent domain.
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cation must come from Congress."2 Congress is best suited to place
restrictions on movement of sports franchises since it may strike a
proper balance between the harm to local entities and the conse-
quences to interstate commerce." 3 Congressional action of this sort
should expressly preempt local efforts to -take sports franchises by
eminent domain'14 in order to provide for uniformity among the
states.
VI. Proposed Federal Legislation to Protect Cities' Interests in
Restricting Franchise Relocation
A. City and Community Interests Which Justify Placing
Restrictions on Sports Franchise Relocation
The public has a strong interest in professional sports franchises.
In addition to providing entertainment,' 85 sports franchises provide
community members with a source of local pride. 8 6 "[C]ommunities
in which professional sports teams play derive substantial revenues
and employment opportunities from the operation of such teams.'
' 7
Prompted by local public interest in a particular sports team,
municipalities, through municipal stadium authorities, generally au-
thorize capital construction bonds to finance construction of a stad-
ium to house the sports team.' 88 Usually, the stadium is leased to
182. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, Tentative Decision at 22
(filed July 16, 1984).
Should relocation threaten disproportionate harm to a local entity, reg-
ulation, if there is to be any relative to a business in interstate commerce,
should come at the Federal level since only then can the consequences
to interstate commerce be assessed and a proper balance struck to consider
and serve the various interests involved in a uniform manner.
Id.
183. Id.
184. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
185. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(l), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(2), 131 CONG. REC.
S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (bill regarding professional football teams only).
186. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(l), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1), 131 CONG. REC.
S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) ("professional football teams" provide "a
source of pride to their supporters").
187. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(9), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3), 131 CONG. REc.
S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) ("substantial tax revenues and employment
opportunities derive from the operation of professional football teams to the cities
and regions in which they are located").
188. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(3), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily
19851 SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION
*sports teams by the municipal stadium authority for a minimal price
which does not fully reimburse the public for stadium construction
costs. 189 This subsidy provides the locality with further impetus to
keep its sports teams from relocating. Nevertheless, professional
sports teams may be enticed to relocate, in spite of the close as-
sociation with and the support they receive from their community,
for immediate and greater financial gain. 90
"[Sitability in the location of professional sports teams . .. en-
hances the quality of athletic competition . . ." in the teams' re-
spective league.' 9' Nevertheless, teams have become more likely to
relocate because of the scarcity of major league sports teams. This
paucity coupled with the failure of leagues to expand and accom-
modate the public's needs has led to detrimental bidding wars among
cities to lure sports franchises.' 92 As a result, there is a need for
legislation to discourage the unnecessary relocation of sports teams
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see S. 172, 99th ConS., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(4), 131 CONG. REC.
S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (bill regard'ng professional football teams only).
189. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(4), 131 CoNG. REc. S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(4), 131 CONG. REC.
S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (bill regarding professional football teams only).
190. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(6), 131 CONG. REc. 5663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985). "It's the fans who seem to suffer most when a much-loved
ball team moves from one city to another, but there are those who say that as
the game of musical cities continues, professional sports is suffering as well." The
Eagles Leave Philadelphia, ABC News Nightline, Dec. 12, 1984, Transcript of Show
#928 at 2.
191. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(7), 131 CONG. REC S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
192. [Rjelocations of professional sports teams are likely to occur more
frequently, when the number of communities which believe they can
adequately support a team exceeds the number of franchises made avail-
able by professional sports leagues; . . . because maintaining the number
of franchises in a league below the level of demand increases the value
of the existing franchises, increases the bargaining power of the holders
of existing franchises with stadium authorities, and causes revenues from
broadcasting (to the extent such revenues are shared) to be shared by
fewer teams, previous increases in the number of franchises in any league
generally have not been solely in response to the demand of the com-
munities which seek such a franchise.
S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(2), (3), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S667-68 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see id. § 101(b), 131 CONG. REC. at S665 ("increased frequency
of bidding contests between communities regarding the location of professional
sports teams (which contests are in most cases not in the best interests of such
communities) has necessitated the establishment of a procedure by which important
community interests are considered in the relocation decision process ... ").
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that receive adequate financial and nonfinancial support from their
communities. 193
Only federal legislation can provide a uniform and nondiscrimi-
natory remedy for municipalities in every state. Attempts by local
governmental units to restrict franchise relocation are likely to operate
in a discriminatory manner and subject sports franchises to disparate
treatment.' 94 Furthermore, because the local exercise of eminent do-
main arguably violates the commerce clause,' 95 Congress must protect
community interests through carefully drawn legislation that operates
in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner.' 96
Congress may legislate in this area under its commerce power' 97
since sports teams are engaged in interstate commerce. Professional
teams use materials that are shipped in interstate commerce, travel
interstate to compete' 98 and have their games broadcast nationally. 99
Moreover, stadiums often serve as a focal point for urban renewal
projects that receive federal assistance. 200
B. Current Proposals for Federal Legislation
Congress currently is considering various proposals that would
restrict the ability of professional sports teams to leave cities that
have supported them. 0' "Proposals now under consideration in Con-
gress involve either giving the N.F.L. and other professional leagues
limited antitrust exemptions so that they could block their teams
from skipping town without good reason, or authorizing Federal
193. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b), 131 CONo. REC. S665 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985); 131 CONG. REC. S288 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) ("[ulnless Congress acts, leagues may be unable to expand due to
instability in team location policies ... and uncertainty as to revenue distribution").
194. See supra notes 161, 174 and accompanying text.
195. The local exercise of eminent domain to take a sports franchise would
violate the commerce clause. See supra notes 157-84 and acompanying text.
196. Only Congress can strike the proper balance between the harm that sports
franchise relocation causes to local entities and the consequences to interstate
commerce that would result from restricting the ability of sports franchises to
relocate. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
198. See S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(6), 131 CONG. REC. S282, S285
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (referring to professsional football teams).
199. Id.
200. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(5), 131 CONG. REc. S663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan, 24,. 1985).
201. See Taylor, Legislators Study Defenses to Keep Teams in Place, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 20, 1985, § 5, at 12, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Legislators Study Defenses].
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arbitrators and courts to veto team moves, or some combination of
the two approaches." 202
1. Senator DeConcini's Proposal
Senator DeConcini has stated that he will introduce legislation
"designed to protect sports communities from arbitrary abandonment
by club owners .. ".. ,,20 The best way to accomplish this goal,
according to Senator DeConcini, is to allow sports leagues to prevent
member teams from moving in spite of antitrust challenges and to
allow leagues to enforce rules that "tend to promote comparable
economic opportunities for member clubs." 2°4 Moreover, he states
that "farsighted revenue sharing rules adopted by some leagues ...
[will curb] the temptation for teams to hopscotch across the country
seeking marginal economic advantage at the expense of loyal fans"
if they are made enforceable. 205 He concludes, therefore, that antitrust
202. Id. Senators Dennis DeConcini, Arlen Specter and Slade Gorton have pro-
posed such legislation. Id.
203. 131 CONG. REc. S287 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Senator DeConcini has subsequently introduced his bill. See S. 298, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S682, S683 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
204. 131 CONG. REC. S287 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); see S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(l)(a), 131 CONG. Rvc. S683 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) ("it shall not be
unlawful by reason of any provision of the antitrust laws for a professional team
sports league and its member clubs . . .to enforce rules or agreements authorizing
the membership of the league to decide that a member club of such league shall
not be relocated from its league-franchised home area provided that nothing in
this subsection shall otherwise affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to any action instituted by a municipality or other public authority
challenging the relocation of a club from its league-franchised home area ...").
This proposal "would overrule the decisions by a Federal judge, jury and appeals
court that the N.F.L.'s effort to block the Raiders' move from Oakland to Los
Angeles was a conspiracy among economic competitors to restrain trade, in violation
of the antitrust laws." Legislators Study Defenses, supra note 201, at col. 2. The
National Football League's rule requiring three-fourths of its member teams to
approve the movement of one team into another team's league territory has been
held to violate federal antitrust law. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. N.F.L., 726 F.2d 1381, 1386, 1395-98 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
397 (1984). See generally Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Re-
location Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 221 (1984)
(discussing invalidation of NFL rule under antitrust law).
205. 131 CONG. REC. S287 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini);
see S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(l)(b), 131 CONG. REc. S683 (daily ed. Jan.
24, 1985) ("it shall not be unlawful by reason of any provision of the antitrust
laws for a professional team sports league and its member clubs ... to enforce
rules or agreements for the division of league or member club revenues that tend
to promote comparable economic opportunities for the member clubs of such a
league . . .").
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laws should not be applied to intraleague agreements."' By giving
the power to the sports leagues, Senator DeConcini believes that
the legislation will be more effective since the courts and Congress
will not be put in the position of "second-guessing the [properly
exercised] business judgment of leagues. ''207
2. The Professional Football Stabilization Act
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania has introduced a bill entitled
the "Professional Football Stabilization Act" (Stabilization Act).2 °8
The Stabilization Act would make it unlawful for professional foot-
ball teams to relocate if they have played home games in a mu-
nicipality for six or more continuous years unless one of the following
exceptions is met: 20 9 (1) a party other than the team materially
breached a provision of the stadium lease agreement that is essential
to profitability, and the breach cannot be remedied within a rea-
sonable time;210 (2) the stadium the team currently uses is "inadequate
for the purposes of profitably operating the team," and the stadium
authority has demonstrated no intent to remedy the inadequacies;
211
or (3) the team either has incurred new annual losses for the three
immediately preceding years or has suffered losses over a shorter
term that "Zndanger the continued profitability of the team.
212
Even if one of the three exceptions is met, an owner who attempts
to relocate by sale must give "the governmental authority ' 213 the
206. 131 CONG. REC. S287, S288 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini)
207. Id. Senator Deconcini's proposal is favored by the NFL. See Legislators
Study Defenses, supra note 201, at col. 2. The bill will not be retroactive. Id. at
col. 2.
208. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan.
3, 1985).
209. Id. § 4.
210. Id. § 4(1).
211. Id. § 4(2).
212. Id. § 4(3). "[Iln computing net losses of the team, no personal obligations
or losses of the owner may be included in salaries, other compensation or expenses
to owners or owners' family members except to the extent they are ordinary,
reasonable and necessary compensation and expenses." Id. Subsection three further
requires that a team seeking to relocate notify the "local governemental authority
at least one hundred and twenty days before relocation." Id.
213. Alternatively, any person the governmental authority selects shall have a
right of first refusal. Id. § 4(3).
Where an owner intends to sell the team and relocate it, the governmental
authority shall decide whether the criteria for relocation have been satisfied
and if it finds that they have been, the governmental authority or any
person it selects shall have a right of first refusal and may make an
offer to purchase and retain the team. If any such retention offer
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right of first refusal.21 4 If the authority makes an offer to purchase
and retain the team that is substantially equal to the relocation
offer, the move will be disallowed." 5 The owner could circumvent
this restriction, however, by moving the team himself and subse-
quently making the sale to the prospective purchaser in the new
location. Under the bill, an owner who could not meet one of the
three exceptions could not force a city to present him with a com-
parable offer and might have no choice but to retain ownership of
his team. 21 6 If none of the three exceptions were met, the municipality
could bring a civil action in the federal district court to prevent the
team's relocation. 21 7 Additionally, the bill would exempt from an-
titrust law intraleague agreements which restrict the movement of
any member team provided that these agreements are in accordance
with the Stabilization Act."' s
3. The Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act
Senator Slade Gorton of Washington has introduced a bill entitled
the "Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act" (Pro-
tection Act),21 9 which would apply to "any proposed relocation
of a professional baseball, basketball, football, or hockey team
which plays its home games in a community within the United
States ..... ,o The relocation restrictions of the bill would apply
substantially equals the relocation offer, then relocation shall be unlawful.
Id.
214. Id. The governmental authority is granted the right of first refusal in




217. See id. §§ 4(3), 6.
218. Id. § 5.
219 S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily ed. Jan.
24, 1985). The stated policy of the bill is to:
discourage the unnecessary relocation of any professional sports team
which is receiving adequate support from the people in the community
in which such team plays, and to encourage, to the extent practicable,
continuity and stability in the location of professional sports teams. The
increased frequency of bidding contests between communities regarding
the location of professional sports teams (which contests are in most
cases not in the best interests of such communities) has necessitated the
establishment of a procedure by which important community interests
are considered in the relocation decision process.
Id. § 101(b).
220. Id. § 110, 131 CONG. REc. at S667. The act would include only major
league baseball, basketball, football or hockey teams, see id. § 401(3), 131 CONG.
19851
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neither to a league decision, pursuant to a lawful league rule, to
refuse to allow a member team to relocate nor to any relocation
within the team's community. 22
Under the bill, a professional sports team could not leave its
community and relocate unless two criteria are met: (1) its league
determines that the proposed relocation is necessary and appropriate
after consideration of the policy and purpose of the legislation and
certain enumerated factors; 222 and (2) either an arbitration board has
approved the relocation 223 or the relevant community has provided
notice that it does not desire that an arbitration board be estab-
lished. 224 On the other hand, if the Board of Arbitrators finds that
REc. at S668, that are members of a league "which has been engaged in competition
in such sport for more than seven years" except that the seven-year requirement
will not apply to Title II of the act which applies to agreements relating to sponsored
telecasting. See id. §§ 202(f), 401(2), 131 CONG. REC. at S667-68. This provision
would enable franchises in new leagues, such as the United States Football League,
to move about freely for seven years and, thereby, increase the league's chances
of establishing itself. For a general discussion of the bill, see Legislators Study
Defenses, supra note 201, at cols. 2-3.
221. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(c), 131 CONG. REC S663, S666 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
222. Id. § 104(a)(1), 131 CONG. REC. at S665; see also id. § 101(b) (statement
of policy); § 102 (purpose of title); § 104(b) (enumerated factors to be considered
when determining whether team may relocate). The enumerated factors to be
considered are:
(1) the adequacy of the stadium in which the team played its home
games in the previous season and the willingness of the stadium authority
to remedy any deficiencies in such facility; (2) the extent to which fan
support for the team has been demonstrated during the team's tenure
in the community; (3) the extent to which the team has, directly or
indirectly, received public financial support by means of any publicly
financed playing facility, special tax treatment, and any other form of
public financial support; (4) the degree to which the owner or management
of the team has contributed to any circumstance which might otherwise
demonstrate the need for such relocation; (5) whether the team has
incurred net operating losses, exclusive of depreciation and amortization,
sufficient to threaten the continued financial viability of the team; (6)
the degree to which the team has engaged in good faith negotiations
with members and representatives of the community concerning terms
and conditions under which the team would continue to play its games
in such community; (7) whether any other team in its league is located
in the community in which the team is currently located; (8) whether
the team proposes to relocate to a community in which no other team
in its league is located; and (9) whether the stadium authority, if public,
is not opposed to such relocation.
Id, § 104(b), 131 CONG. REC. at S666.
223. Id. § 104(a)(2), 131 CONG. REC. at S666.
224. Id. § 104(a)(2).
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"the proposed relocation is not necessary and appropriate, the Board
shall disapprove the proposed relocation. ' 25 If the Board finds the
relocation is necessary and appropriate but also receives a sufficient
offer of retention from a prospective purchaser who will not relocate
the team,226 the owner has the option of either accepting the offer227
or rejecting the offer and keeping the team in its present locale. 221
The Protection Act provides for limited judicial review to determine
if the enumerated factors were specifically considered 229 if review is
sought within thirty days after the decision. 20 Judicial review of the
determinations of compensation23 ' and satisfaction of league criteria 23 2
would be limited to consideration of whether the "decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or was a violation
of any applicable Federal or State law. ' 233
Furthermore, the Protection Act exempts from antitrust laws agree-
ments by a majority of league members to share telecasting reve-
nues.2 14 It also prohibits publicly owned facilities from unreasonably
denying access to professional sports teams. 235 Lastly, based on a
number of findings, 236 the Protection Act would make the failure
of Major League Baseball and the NFL to expand, according to
225. Id. § 107(d).
226. In order for an offer of retention to be sufficient it must be "equal to or
greater in value than the proposed relocation," id. § 107(g), 131 CONG. REC. at
S667, and it must satisfy the league's criteria for transfer of membership as
determined by a majority vote of league members. Id. § 107(f)(2), 131 CONG. REC.
at S666-67.
227. Id. § 107(f)(2), 131 CONG. REC. at S666-67. If more than one offer of
retention is sufficient the team owner may only elect to accept that offer which
is preferred by the league. Id. ("[lhf the team owner elects to accept any [offer
of retention], the team owner shall accept any offer which is preferred by the
league . . .").
228. Id.
229. See id. § 108(b), (c), 131 CONG. REC. at S667.
230. Id. § 108(d).
231. See id. § 108(e).
232. See id. § 107(f)(2), 131 CONG. REc. at S666-67.
233. Id. § 108(e), 131 CONG. REC. at S667.
234. Id. § 201.
235. Id. § 202. Furthermore, each stadium shall be made available at "substantially
comparable rates, rentals, and other charges and under nondiscriminatory and
substantially comparable rules, regulations, and conditions." Id. § 202(a)(1).
236. Id. § 302, 131 CONG. REC. at S667-68. One important finding is that the
special treatment afforded to the leagues by Congress under antitrust laws might
continue to perpetuate the scarcity of franchises if not coupled with measures to
prevent leagues from unreasonably failing to respond to the public's need for
sports franchises. Id. § 302(8), 131 CONG. REC. at S668.
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the Act, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.237 The bill would
not apply retroactively to actions filed prior to January 24, 1985238
and, therefore, would not affect Baltimore's and Oakland's efforts
to condemn the Colts and Raiders respectively.
C. Analysis and Recommendations
The Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act appears
best suited to protect the interests of cities in restricting franchise
relocation. Unlike the Stabilization Act, 239 the Protection Act provides
complete relief to all major sports leagues.2 40 Furthermore, the relief
contemplated by the Protection Act, unlike Senator DeConcini's
proposal, 24' does not depend totally on sports leagues to protect
local interests since it also requires an arbitration board to approve
team relocation. 22 The presupposition that sports leagues will ad-
equately protect the interests of individual communities is flawed
since, due to league revenue sharing plans which make expansion
less profitable to current league members, leagues have not always
expanded to accommodate the needs of communities.
243
While the DeConcini proposal2" and the Stabilization Act 2 45 might
237. Id. § 303.
238. Id. § 110, 131 CONG. REC. at S667.
.239. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 5282, S285 (daily ed. Jan.
3, 1985).
240. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110, 131 CONG. REC. S663, S667 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985). Senator DeConcini's proposal would also apply to all sports. See
131 CONG. REC. S288 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see
also notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing Sen. DeConcini's proposal).
241. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
243. [B]ecause maintaining the number of franchises in a league below
the level of demand increases the value of the existing franchises, increases
the bargaining power of the holders of existing franchises with stadium
authorities, and causes revenues from broadcasting (to the extent such
revenues are shared) to be shared by fewer teams, previous increases in
the number of franchises in any league generally have not been solely
in response to the demand of the communities which seek such a franchise[.]
S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(3), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S667-68 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985). In the absence of legislation expansion is not likely to occur in
the near future. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle has stated: "I thought we would
have expanded to 30 teams by now, . . . [blut the league owners have been concerned.
They want to pick their own owners and make sure there is some degree of stability
in a franchise." Rozelle says NFL Financially Sound, 72 No. 12 Star-Ledger (Newark)
at 64, col. 5 (Mar. 12, 1985).
244. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(3), (4), (6), (7), (8), 131 CONG. REC.
S663, S667-68 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
245. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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help limit unnecessary franchise relocation, only the Protection Act
would protect communities from unnecessary relocation2 46 and, at
the same time, aid cities without franchises in their efforts to obtain
teams by requiring certain leagues to expand.2 47 Although forced
expansion may seem to be a drastic measure, it is justified by the
fact that the antitrust exemption Congress has given to league agree-
ments for the sharing of revenue from telecasts has resulted in a
scarcity of teams.2 48 Therefore, a major strength of the Protection
Act is that it would not discriminate in favor of communities which
already have teams because its restriction on team movement is
flexible enough to allow consideration of the comparative needs of
other communities before a determination of the necessity of re-
location is made. Further, it would be coupled with a provision to
aid other viable communities in their effort to obtain teams by
requiring limited expansion.
The Stabilization Act could harm the bargaining position of teams
seeking to negotiate stadium lease agreements because it would pro-
hibit teams from relocating unless the lease offer were so inadequate
as to render operation of a team unprofitable.2 49 By contrast, the
Protection Act would encourage fair dealing in the negotiation of
stadium lease agreements because an uncompetitive lease offer would
be considered in both the league's and the arbitration board's de-
terminations of the necessity of relocation. 2 0 The Protection Act
246. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104, 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665-66 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
247. See id. § 303, 131 CONG. REC. at S668.
248. See id. § 302, 131 CONG. REC. at S667-68. While it may be argued that
Congress should not involve itself in the professional sports market, see supra note
207, it is apparent that the sports market does not possess all the characteristics
of a free market system and, as a result, it has not responded to the demand for
professional sports franchises. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(3), (6), (7),
(8), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S667-68 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985). There are significant
barriers to entry in the sports market. For example, the National Football League's
rules prohibit a buyer from purchasing a team without the approval of the league's
members. See supra note 60. Furthermore, the NFL's rules prohibit cities from
purchasing franchises on more than an interim basis and may prohibit any ownership
whatsoever. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. These barriers have led to
detrimental bidding wars between cities to obtain sports franchises. See supra note
192 and accompanying text. Moreover, leagues have incentive to resist expansion
because expansion would decrease the value of existing teams and reduce their pro-
portion of shared revenues. See S. 287 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(3), 131 CONG.
REc. S663, S667-68 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985); supra note 243 and accompanying text.
249. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 131 CONG. REC. S282, S285 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1985).
250. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b)(3), 131 CONG. REC. S665, S665-
66 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
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would allow for consideration of particular facts, such as an un-
competitive lease offer, because it does not limit its application to
any per se rules. Instead, the Protection Act would allow a relocation
determination to vary according to particular fact situations after
consideration of certain enumerated factors.25'
The guided flexibility of the Protection Act is one of its greatest
assets. While the Stabilization Act contains very objective per se
profitability-based exceptions to its general restriction on franchise
relocation,252 its failure to consider facts that are unrelated to prof-
itability could unjustly prevent a sports team from relocating. For
example, the Stabilization Act would not allow a team to relocate
if it were making a minimal profit despite the fact that another
community would derive greater benefits from the team's presence
and provide the team with greater local support. Furthermore, the
Stabilization Act is not flexible enough to prevent the relocation of
a team, although such action would cause substantial harm to the
community, if it could not meet the arbitrary requirement that the
team be located in the community for the prior six years.2 3
The Protection Act would allow for the solicitation of offers of
retention, but, unlike the use of eminent domain actions, it would
leave the owner with the option of retaining ownership of the team
in its present location or accepting an adequate offer of retention. 5 4
Therefore, an owner would not be forced to sell his team.
The Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act should
be enacted by Congress since it best protects communities' interests
in preventing sports franchises from relocating. However, it should
be amended to include a provision that expressly preempts 55 local
251. See id. § 104; supra note 222 and accompanying text.
252. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 131 CONG. REC. S282, S285 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1985).
253. See id. § 4.
254. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(f)(2), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S666-67
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
255. The inclusion of an express preemption provision would be the most effective
way to prevent a proliferation of discriminatory and nonuniform state eminent
domain actions.
The goals of an express preemption [provision] . . . should be to prevent
subtle or incremental state encroachment into a field that Congress has
chosen expressly to reserve for federal law .... Once Congress has
declared its express intent to preempt or to save a state law, it has
largely obviated judicial inquiry into considerations other than those
concerning the text of the preemption provision.
Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans:
An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1984) (emphasis
added).
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use of eminent domain 256 to prevent franchise relocation as of the
date the bill is enacted. The inclusion of an express preemption
provision would prevent the improper use of eminent domain and
would insure that communities would be provided with adequate
relief. Moreover, the provision would prevent a community from
256. Federal legislation that preempts the use of eminent domain by state or
local governments would not be an unconstitutional violation of the tenth amend-
ment. Although the power of eminent domain is a traditional aspect of state
sovereignty, the tenth amendment will not bar congressional action that deprives
states of this power or limits its exercise. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
Until recently the tenth amendment sheltered states from some of the mandates
of federal legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Recently,
however, the Court overruled National League of Cities and its progeny in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135, 4136 (U.S. Feb.
19, 1985), stating the "principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power
is that inherent in all congressional action-the built in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal government action." Id. at 4142.
However, the dissent indicated that the Court may return shortly to its former
position. Id. at 4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will,
I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court").
Therefore, a look at whether federal legislation could preempt states from using
their power of eminent domain to take sports franchises under the former line of
cases is worthwhile.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981),
the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test based on National League of Cities
to determine when congressional legislation based on the commerce clause con-
travened the tenth amendment and was therefore invalid.
First there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters
that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And third, it must
be apparent that the States' compliance with federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions."
Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted).
Although the power of eminent domain is indisputably an attribute of state
sovereignty, there is little question that the federal government could regulate or
preempt a state's power to take sports franchises by eminent domain under the
abandoned National League of Cities standard, since the operation of a sports
franchise is not an integral part of the traditional state activities generally immune
from federal regulation. See Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455
U.S. 678, 685 (1982) ("operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is
not an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from federal
regulation under National League of Cities"). Furthermore, it is important to note
that satisfaction of Hodel's three requirements would not guarantee that a tenth
amendment challenge to congressional power would succeed based on the prior
standard because "[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981).
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instituting an eminent domain action after it had failed to prevent
a team from relocating under the federal law.
VII. Conclusion
United States courts have paid little attention to the fifth amend-
ment's requirements of public use and just compensation. The de-
ference given to legislative determinations of public use, the broad
definition given to the term "public use" coupled with conservative
awards of compensation and the governments' right to reconvey
property, have given state and local governments every incentive to
test the limits of their eminent domain power.
Although the growth of public use may be attributed to the
rationale that the concept must expand to meet the complex and
ever-changing needs of society, it should not be applied in a manner
that violates the rights of individuals. State courts should recognize
their duty to enforce the public use requirement of their own state
constitutions. However, if they continue to give great deference to
legislative bodies, they should be more liberal in their awards of
compensation where the subject of condemnation is less traditional.
A broad range of evidence, therefore, should be allowed at trial to
establish just compensation for the taking of a sports franchise. The
failure to award compensation that is truly just would leave both
the fifth amendment's public use and just compensation clauses
"without any teeth."
Legislation regulating sports team relocation is necessary since
cities have provided benefits to teams and, therefore, should not be
subject to the harm that accompanies unnecessary relocation. The
exercise of eminent domain to take a sports franchise arguably
violates the commerce clause, and, therefore, legislation to protect
the interests of cities in restricting sports franchise relocation must
come from Congress. Moreover, Congress is best suited to provide
relief that is uniform and non-discriminatory. The Professional Sports
Team Community Protection Act would provide such relief.
This Act would protect the interests of cities with and without
sports teams and would not unnecessarily restrict relocation. It would
require consideration of numerous factors in order to insure a just
result. At the same time, the Protection Act would allow flexibility
so that the circumstances of a particular fact situation could be con-
sidered. Therefore, the Protection Act should be enacted with the
addition of a clause that expressly preempts cities from instituting
eminent domain actions to further restrict team relocation.
Thomas W.E. Joyce III
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